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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

TRAVIS BERTOCH,

:

Case No. 20030111-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse and permit Bertoch to
withdraw his conditional guilty plea because Bertoch properly preserved his argument
for appeal, the trial court erred by denying Bertoch's motion to suppress the evidence
taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by denying Bertoch's motion to
suppress the statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and Bertoch is not
required to show prejudice when appealingfroma conditional guilty plea.
ARGUMENT
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse because: (A) Bertoch
properly preserved both his Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments, (B) the trial court
erred by ruling the frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment, (C) the trial court erred
by ruling Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements were not elicited in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, and (D) Bertoch is not required to show prejudice.

A.

Bertoch Properly Preserved Both His Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Arguments For Appeal.
The preservation requirement exists because "the trial court ought to be given an

opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhanc[ing]
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming] on
appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74,^11,10 P.3d 346
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Accordingly, an issue is
properly preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue.'"" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125,
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted); Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT
App 239,Tf26, 8 P.3d 281 (holding "party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is
brought 'to a "level of consciousness'"" (citations omitted)); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d
769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection timely because he "met the
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial
court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)). This Court should address both
Bertoch's Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments because they are properly preserved.
1.

Bertoch's Fourth Amendment Argument is Properly Preserved.
The State argues Bertoch did not preserve his Fourth Amendment argument

because he "never attacked the weapons pat-down" and "affirmatively conceded its
permissibility" below Aple. Br. at 10. The record, however, undermines the State's
2

argument. R. 59-60; 287; 295:2-5. In his memorandum in support of his motion to
suppress, Bertoch argued nthe paraphernalia (pipe) and the 'baggie' of green leafy
substance must be suppressed" because it violated the Fourth Amendment. R. 59. He
acknowledged the United States Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), that flsearch[es] for weapons in a pat-down or frisk" are generally permissible.
Id. But he argued the frisk in this case was not permissible because Trooper Witte
(Witte) did not have a reasonable fear that Bertoch was armed and presently dangerous.
Id. Specifically, Bertoch explained that Witte "testified at the Preliminary Hearing that
he initiated the 'frisk' because of'officer's safety,'" and later clarified on cross
examination that he feared for his safety because "he had been 'rear-ended' twice when
he had previously made stops of other vehicles." IcL_ Bertoch then argued that Witte did
not have reasonable fear to justify afriskbecause being "'rear-ended' twice during stops
has nothing to do with patting down a person." Id. at 59-60. Later, Bertoch appeared at
a motion hearing prepared to answer any questions the trial court had about his argument.
R. 295: 2. The trial court, however, had no questions and stated it would based its ruling
on the memoranda submitted by the parties. Id at 4-5. Thus, by arguing the frisk
violated the Fourth Amendment because Witte had no reasonable fear of danger, Bertoch
provided the trial court an opportunity to rule on the legality of the frisk and surrendered
any possible strategy to forego objecting and save the issue for appeal. R. 59-60.
Moreover, the trial court did rule on the validity of the frisk. R. 287:4. Specifically, the

3

trial court ruled the frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment because, even though
Witte's fear of being rear-ended had nothing to do with Bertoch's perceived
dangerousness, "[o]nce [Witte] smelled alcohol and took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle,
he had a right to frisk him."1 Id
Besides, even if Bertoch had not raised the sub-argument that the frisk violated
the Fourth Amendment because Witte lacked reasonable fear of danger, he properly
preserved the issue for appeal by arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
See State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,Tf25 n. 4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing identity
issue even though not specifically preserved because defendant preserved probable cause
issue and "State bears the burden of proving" articulable suspicion (including identity)
within probable cause issue). Unlike the cases cited by the State in its brief, Bertoch did
not change his argument on appeal. See. Aple. Br. at 8; State v. Richins. 2004 UT App
36,^fl[9, 11, 86 P.3d 759 (holding defendant did not preserve his argument that the trial

1

The State suggests that the trial court's ruling on the validity of the frisk and
Witte's explanation of his safety concerns are summary because Bertoch did not "contest
the reasonableness" of Witte's "safety concerns" or challenge the validity of the frisk.
Aple. Br. at 9 n. 7. Contrary to the State's argument, Bertoch challenged both the
reasonableness of Witte's safety concerns and the validity of the frisk. R. 59-60. Thus, it
was the State's burden to present enough evidence to show Witte had reasonable
suspicion of a weapon to justify the warrantless frisk. See State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d
480, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding "officer must justify a pat down search by
'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion'" (citation omitted)). Absent a sufficient showing
of reasonable suspicion, the trial court should have ruled the frisk was unconstitutional.
See State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,1(14, 78 P.3d 590 (holding trial court must decide
reasonableness of frisk "objectively according to the totality of the circumstances").
4

court violated rule 11(e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (requiring
factual basis for plea) because below he argued the trial court violated rule 11(e)(4)(A)
(requiring defendant understands elements of offense before plea) and trial court's
findings only pertained to rule 11(e)(4)(A)); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (holding defendant did not preserve argument that conviction violated First
Amendment because argued below that conviction violated "right to equal protection and
due process"; argument on appeal "concerned different facts and involved different legal
criteria"; and "trial court made no findings relevant to those legal doctrines"); RochelL
850 P.2d at 484 n. 3 (noting defendant waived "issue of voluntariness of consent"
because argued below detention and frisk were illegal but did not argue subsequent
consent was product of police exploitation). Rather, he maintained his original
argument, merely developing it where necessary to satisfy the rigorous demands of
appellate review. Cf. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30^38. 996 P.2d 1043
(Zimmerman, J., concurring) (noting preservation rule exists "so that the refining process
that occurs through proper claim preservation and development through the trial and
appellate courts brings issues to us fully developed and briefed").
2.

Bertoch's Fifth Amendment Argument Is Properly Preserved.
The State argues Bertoch waived his Fifth Amendment argument because he did

not challenge the trial court's finding that his statements "were volunteered." Aple. Br.
at 12, 18. This argument, however, is meaningless because the State concedes that

5

Bertoch preserved his argument that his statements were extracted during custodial
interrogation. Id at 12-13. "The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being
compelled to give evidence against themselves.1' State v. Bunting. 2002 UT App
195,^14, 51 P.3d 37 (quotations and citations omitted). When invoked to suppress a
statement, the Fifth Amendment requires the prosecution to demonstrate "the statement
was made voluntarily," and the trial court to "determine whether [the] statement was
made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Id.
(quotations and citations omitted). In other words, if a defendant argues a statement was
illegally obtained through custodial interrogation, he is implicitly arguing the statement
was made involuntarily. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 462 (1966) (holding, to
satisfy Fifth Amendment standards, evidence must show "the accused was not
involuntarily impelled to make a statement, when but for the improper influences he
would have remained silent"); Bram v. United States. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding,
"wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary,
the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment... commanding that no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."); State
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1986) ("In order for a statement to be deemed
voluntary as a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, the statement must not have been
elicited by threats or violence or by any direct or implied promises.").
Here, Bertoch preserved his Fifth Amendment claim by arguing his pre-Miranda

6

statements were elicited while he was under custodial interrogation. R. 57-59. Because
voluntariness was implicitly included in his argument, Bertoch was not required to
simultaneously argue that his statements elicited under custodial interrogation were
involuntary. Id Moreover, the trial court recognized the inherent presence of
involuntariness in Bertoch's custodial interrogation argument and ruled not only that
Bertoch was not "in custody" but also that Bertoch's statements were "volunteered." R.
287:3. Thus, because the trial court ruled on the voluntariness of Bertoch's statements,
the issue of voluntariness is preserve. See. Holmstromu 2000 UT App 239 at ^26 (holding
issue preserved if "it is brought 'to [trial court's] "level of consciousness"'" (citations
omitted)). Finally, Bertoch was not required to renew his motion after the trial court's
ruling. See State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,1J14,20 P.3d 265 (holding Utah courts "will
not require a party to continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court
has rendered a decision on the issue").
R

The Trial Court Erred Bv Ruling the Frisk Did Not Violate the Fourth
Amendment,
First, the State attempts to minimize the intrusiveness of the frisk in this case by

citing a footnote in Terry that describes a frisk as a search of "'every portion of the
[person's] body/" including "'arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" Aple. Br. at 9 n.
7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 16 n. 13 (1968)). This footnote, however, does not define
the Supreme Court's vision of a frisk under Terry. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 & n. 13.
7

Rather, it is an example provided to demonstrate the extent to which a frisk "may inflict
indignity and arouse strong resentment." Id. In reality, the "Terry Court described a
frisk as 'a carefully limited search of the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault' an officer." State v. White. 856 P.2d 656, 660
n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). In Terry, the officer "patted down the
outside of [the defendant's] clothing." Terry. 392 U.S. at 7. Similarly, in this case, Witte
testified that he "patted [Bertoch] down" and "performed a Terry frisk on [Bertoch]." R.
294:7, 9, 14, 17. Thus, contrary to the State's suggestion, Witte's frisk of Bertoch was a
frisk as defined by Terry and regulated by the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the State argues Bertoch's arrest triggered either the independent source
doctrine or the inevitable discovery doctrine, bypassing the illegal frisk and making the
evidence admissible through a valid search incident to arrest.2 Aple. Br. at 16. The
inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to look to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the police would

2

To make this argument, the State cites only two cases and provides no analysis or
case comparison. Aple. Br. at 16. Thus, this Court should decline to address the
inevitable discovery or independent source doctrines because the State has inadequately
briefed these issues. See State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT l,Tf31, 973 P.2d 404 (noting that
adequate briefing "'requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based upon that authority'" and refusing to consider
constitutional arguments for inadequate briefing where appellant merely cited relevant
constitutional provisions and four cases but without any meaningful analysis of that
authority (citation omitted)).
8

have discovered the evidence despite the illegality.113 State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT
30,1(14, 76 P.3d 1159. However, it only applies "'[i]f the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means.'" Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984)) (other citation omitted). MA crucial element of inevitable discovery is
independence; there must be some 'independent basis for discovery/ [ United States v.
Boatwright 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987)], and 'the investigation that inevitably
would have led to the evidence [must] be independent of the constitutional violation,
[United States v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997)].'" Id at1jl6 (second
alteration in original). 'Thus, 'the fact or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable
[must] arise from circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search itself."1
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864-65).
If the inevitable discovery doctrine was not raised before or relied on by the trial
court, an appellate court can still apply it to affirm a trial court's decision to deny a
defendant's motion to suppress. See. id at 1f9 (holding "appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to

3

The "independent source doctrine describes one method of satisfying the
inevitable discovery exception, which is to demonstrate that the same evidence
uncovered by illegal police activity would have been obtained by an entirely
independent, prior investigation." State v. James. 2000 UT 80,^15, 13 P.3d 576.
9

be the basis of its ruling or action" (citations omitted)). "However, not only must the
alternative ground be apparent on the record, it must also be sustainable by the factual
findings of the trial court." Id. ,u[T]he court of appeals must then determine whether the
facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on
the alternate ground.'" Id. (citations omitted).
For example, in Commonwealth v. Mover. 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 108 (Va. Ct.
App. March 8,1994) (No. 1917-93-4) (memorandum opinion), an officer stopped the
defendant for running a red light. Id. at * l-*2; see Addendum A. Because the officer
"detected a strong odor of alcohol," he had the defendant exit the vehicle. Id_ When the
defendant refused to remove his handsfromhis pockets, the officer reached into the
defendant's pocket and discovered drugs. Id. at *2-*3. Later, the officer "had [the
defendant] perform field sobriety tests," and "placed [the defendant] under arrest for
driving while intoxicated." Id. At trial, the court suppressed the drug evidence because
the officer "left out the critical step of the pat down." Id. at *4. The trial court rejected
the Commonwealth's inevitable discovery argument because, "The record fails to
disclose any evidence regarding standard arrest or search procedures employed by the
Fairfax City Police Department in drunk driving cases." Id. at *4-*5. The appellate
court affirmed because "the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence to support a
finding that there was 'a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have
been discovered by lawful means but for the police misconduct.'" Id. at *7 (citation

10

omitted). "The only evidence presented by the Commonwealth relevant to the issue of
inevitable discovery was that [the defendant] was given a field sobriety test and was later
arrested for driving while intoxicated. No evidence or argument was presented regarding
the normal course of police investigation and procedures in cases of this nature." IcL at

In this case, the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress should not be
affirmed under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The State did not argue the inevitable
discovery doctrine below, and the trial court did not rely on the inevitable discovery
doctrine in its ruling. R. 139-151; 287; 295. Accordingly, the inevitable discovery
doctrine is only available as an alternative ground of affirmance and must be sustainable
by the factual findings of the trial court. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[9. However, in
its ruling, the trial court made no findings from which this Court can establish the
evidence found during and after the illegal frisk would have been inevitably discovered.
R. 287. The trial court found the frisk was lawful M[o]nce the officer smelled alcohol and
took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle.'1 R. 287:4. From there, the trial court found,
"Bertoch was later arrested." LI The trial court made no findings that Bertoch's arrest
was inevitable or that the evidence discovered against Bertoch would have been
inevitably found during a search incident to arrest or booking search.4 R. 287.

4

Although the trial court held the evidence was admissible because it was "taken
at the search incident to arrest," the trial court made this ruling based on its previous
ruling that the frisk was valid. R. 287:4. The trial court made no finding that even if the
11

Furthermore, even if this Court were to look to the record rather than the trial
court's findings, there is still not sufficient evidence to support the application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine. The State presented no evidence or argument to show
Bertoch would inevitably have been arrested and lawfully searched incident to that arrest.
R. 139-151; 295. Specifically, there is no evidence or argument in the record
establishing Bertoch would inevitably have been arrested under M[r]outine or standard
police procedures" and searched incident to that arrest. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at f 17
("Routine or standard police procedures are often a compelling and reliable foundation
for inevitable discovery."); see State v. Callahan, 2004 UT App 164,^10, 499 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23 (holding inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply because State "adduced no
evidence during the trial detailing the normal course of activities that occur after a
controlled narcotics buy is complete"); Mover. 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 108 at *7-*8
(rejecting inevitable discovery argument because "[n]o evidence or argument was
presented regarding the normal course of police investigation and procedures in cases of
this nature"); State v. Lewis, 1990 Kan. App. LEXIS 897,* 14-* 15, 803 P.2d 212 (Kan.
Ct. App. December 14, 1990) (No. 64, 467) (memorandum decision) (suppressing
contents of defendant's purse illegally seized even though defendant was lawfiilly
arrested because "[t]here is nothing in the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress
or of the trial itself on which any court could conclude the purse would have been

frisk was illegal, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Id.
12

available for a custodial search if Officer [] had not taken it out of the car"). Instead, the
results of Bertoch's blood test suggest Bertoch would not inevitably have been arrested.5
R. 105. In fact, Bertoch was never charged with DUI and the booking sheet detailing
Bertoch's arrest shows Bertoch was not even booked for DUI, but for illegal
possession/use of a controlled substance. R. 2-5; 25; see. Addendum B; Callahan. 2004
UT App 164 at f 9 (holding "the argument that 'if we hadn't done it wrong, we would
have done it right,' is far from compelling" (quotations and citation omitted)).
Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the evidence should have been
suppressed. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[11 (holding State's failure to meet

5

In its brief, the State concedes Bertoch's blood tests came back negative for drug
or alcohol impairment. Aple. Br. at 6 n. 6. The State then notes the "final toxicology
report was not included in the record" and hints that Bertoch may actually have been
impaired. Id The State's suggestion is inappropriate for this Court's consideration
because it is not supported by any evidence in the record. See. Tisco Intermountain &
State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it
cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the absence of evidence). Moreover, the State
suggests that Bertoch "admitted that he failed the field tests and exhibited signs of
impairment" to support his argument that he was incapable of knowingly waiving his
Miranda rights. Aple. Br. at 6 n. 6. Bertoch, however, did not admit impairment. Id.; R.
66-68. In fact, he specifically argued that he was not impaired and did not appear
impaired because Witte followed him "to observe his driving pattern" and saw "nothing
to criticize"; Witte acknowledged Bertoch had "broken ankles 'a couple' of times but did
not note that Mr. Bertoch was suffering from a crushed toe"; Witte did not consider that
Bertoch's "eye problems" might have been explained by his "need to wear corrective
lenses"; and "the chemical tests disproved the presence of both alcohol and
marijuana/metabolites." R. 66-67. Rather, Bertoch argued his inability to knowingly
waive his Miranda rights was caused by non-substance-related factors such as
nervousness caused by being followed, stopped, frisked, accused, tested, searched,
transported, and arrested by armed officers; and inattention caused by the pain of various
physical injuries. R. 67-68.
13

preponderance of evidence requirement of inevitable discovery doctrine required reversal
because when "State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal fails to sustain any
theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence'").
C

The Trial Court Erred By Ruling the Statements Taken Before the Miranda
Reading Were Admissible.
The State argues the trial court did not err by ruling Bertoch's pre-Miranda

statements were admissible because Bertoch was not under custodial interrogation when
he made the statements. Aple. Br. at 17-18. To support this argument, the State suggests
Bertoch's case is similar to Salt Lake City v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), and
State v. Zepeda. 2003 UT App 298 (memorandum decision); and distinguishable from
State v. Mirquet. 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). Aple. Br. at 17-18. The State, however,
provides no case comparisons to demonstrate its proposed similarities and distinctions.
Id. Moreover, a careful reading of the cited cases shows Bertoch's case is
distinguishable from Carner and similar to Mirquet. and too little detail is provided in
Zepeda to conduct a meaningful comparison.
First, Bertoch's case is distinguishable from Carner and similar to Mirquet. In
Carner. the officer stopped the defendant and conducted field sobriety tests because,
upon approaching the car, he discovered an odor of alcohol "coming from the car's
interior" and noticed the defendant had slurred speech. Carner. 669 P.2d at 1169. On
appeal, the defendant argued the field sobriety tests violated the Fifth Amendment
because they constituted custodial interrogation. IcL_ Our supreme court rejected the
14

defendant's argument because the "officer was still in the investigatory stage" during the
field sobriety tests and, "[a]s soon as the officer determined that the defendant's driving
appeared to be impaired due to alcohol, he did arrest him." Id. at 1172.
Conversely, in this case, Bertoch does not argue he was in custody simply because
Witte performed field sobriety tests. Aplt. Br. at 36-40. Rather, Bertoch argues he was
in custody because Witte, after discovering a controlled substance during the illegal frisk
and deciding definitively to arrest him, continued investigating him for over an hour
without ever reading his Miranda rights. Id During this hour, Witte elicited
incriminatory statements by directly accusing him of carrying a controlled substance and
paraphernalia and subjecting him to questioning, field sobriety tests, an additional body
search, a vehicle search, two rides in a patrol car, and a blood test. Id. Thus, as
discussed in Bertoch's opening brief, this case is similar to Mirquet, where our supreme
court held the defendant was in custody because the officer "virtually] command[ed]n
him to "retrieve evidence of a crime" from his vehicle, and should be reversed because
Bertoch's statements were elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment.6 Id. at 38-40.
Second, Zepeda provides too little detail to conduct a meaningful comparison.
Memorandum decisions are intended to address cases which
do not present novel issues of law on appeal, with reference
to well-established precedent arising either from case law or
from unambiguous statutory language. They are intended to

6

A more extensive comparison of Bertoch's case and Mirquet is provided in
Bertoch's opening brief. See. Aplt. Br. at 38-40.
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be of use only to the lower tribunal whose work is the subject
of the appeal, and to the litigants and parties in the case. For
this reason, memorandum decisions usually dispense with
much of the background detail common to an opinion.
Grand County v.Rogers, 2002 UT 25,f7,44 P.3d 734. Thus, memorandum decisions
may be cited only "to the degree that they are useful, authoritatively and persuasively."
Id at TJ16. Otherwise, "[e]xisting primary case law is adequate and more appropriate
because of its more complete reasoning." Id. at ^ 17.
Here, the State suggests this case is similar to Zepeda and thus should be decided
similarly. Aple. Br. at 18. Zepeda. however, contains no factual summary from which to
draw a comparison. See Zepeda. 2003 UT App 298. Instead, it simply lists the factors
considered in other Fifth Amendment cases and summarily concludes the factors do not
exist in Zepeda. Id. Thus, this Court should not rely on Zepeda to decide Bertoch's case
because Mirquet is on point and is better suited for case comparison. See. Grand County.
2002 UT 25 at THJ7-8 (holding memorandum decisions should not be cited where
"[ejxisting primary case law is adequate" because opinions are "more detailed in their
treatment of the matter under review so that persons not familiar with the underlying case
will have sufficient background to understand fully the reasoning and decision reached
by the appellate court").
I).

This Court Should Reverse Because No Showing of Prejudice is Required.
The State argues this Court should not permit Bertoch to withdraw his conditional

guilty plea unless he obtains "on appeal a 'net judgment' in his favor or otherwise
16

significantly change[s] the relationship of the parties." Aple. Br. at 15-16 (citation
omitted). Specifically, the State argues that if this Court holds the evidence was
admissible as a valid search incident to arrest, "only suppression of [Bertoch's]
statements made during the pat-down would result" and "this result would not entitle
[Bertoch] to vacation of his guilty plea." IcL at 14-15. This Court should not adopt the
State's argument, however, because it relies on civil case law even though there is
criminal case law directly on point.7 Icl
Rule 1 l(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure says, "A defendant who
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the [conditional plea of guilty]." Utah R.
Crim. P. 1 l(i). This rule "allows a defendant entering a conditional plea to reserve the
right to appeal 'the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion,' not just
dispositive ones." State v. Montova. 887 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added^: see State v. Rivera. 943 P.2d 1344,1346 (Utah 1997) (same). In other
words, a defendant appealing an issue reserved through a conditional guilty plea need not
show prejudice. See State v. Linderen. 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

7

Specifically, the State's derives its definition of "prevailing party" from civil
case law interpreting the term "prevailing party" as it is used in attorney fee statutes. See
Aple. Br. at 15-16; Texas State Teachers Assoc, v. Garland Independent School Dist..
489 U.S. 782 (1989) (holding "prevailing party" is a statutory term for deciding the
availability of attorney fees); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy. 2002
UT App 73,47 P.3d 92 (same); J. Pochvnok Co. v. Smedsrud. 2003 UT App 375, 80
P.3d 563 (same); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Lacv. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (same); R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11,40 P.3d 1119 (same).
17

(holding in conditional plea context, appellate court must presume prejudice).
For example, in Rivera, the defendant pleaded "no contest to count II to avoid
facing charges on counts I and III, but he expressly reserved his right to appeal the
court's decision to permit prosecution under counts I and II." Rivera, 943 P.2d at 1346.
This Court affirmed because it "found that Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(i) 'does
not allow review of the denial of pretrial motions relating to charges which were
dismissed and to which the defendant did not enter a plea.'" IdL_ at 1345. Our supreme
court reversed because a defendant's plea bargain "cannot be enforced until the condition
he relied on is satisfied." IdL at 1346. Specifically, the defendant "proceeded on the
understanding that if he won on appeal, he could renegotiate with the prosecutor for a
new agreement." Id Moreover, if he wins on appeal, the defendant "will be in the
position to negotiate a more favorable agreement with the prosecutor." Id. Thus:
[T]he court of appeals' decision to enforce a conviction
reached on the basis of [the defendant's] conditional plea
while refusing to review his bindover as to count I is unfair
and therefore contrary to the public policy articulated in Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(b):
"These rules are intended and shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration, and the elimination
of unnecessary expense and delay." (Emphasis
added.)

14
Similarly, here, even if this Court decides only the statements should have been
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suppressed, Bertoch is entitled to withdraw his plea. Bertoch pleaded guilty to a third
degree felony with the understanding that he could appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress. R. 296:5. Then, if he was successful on appeal, he would be
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and either go to trial without the suppressed
evidence or negotiate a new guilty plea that reflected the State's weakened position after
appeal. IdL In other words, even if only the statements should have been suppressed,
Bertoch's case and bargaining power are stronger absent the inadmissible statements and
he is entitled to withdraw his plea and renegotiate his case from his strengthened
position. See Rivera. 943 P.2d at 1346. Thus, it does not matter whether Bertoch's
appeal is dispositive because Bertoch entered his plea with the understanding that he
could appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and his plea bargain
"cannot be enforced until the condition he relied on is satisfied." Id.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Bertoch's conviction because the trial court erred by
denying Bertoch's motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
SUBMITTED this 7 7 * day of June, 2004.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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OPINION: MEMORANDUM OPINION
JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
Robert D. Moyer was indicted for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2248. The trial court suppressed the cocaine seized from
Moyer on the ground that it was discovered as the result of
an illegal search. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues
that notwithstanding the initial unreasonable search, the
evidence would inevitably have been discovered through
lawful means and, as such, should not have been
suppressed. Because wefindno evidence in the record to
support a finding of inevitable discovery, we affirm the
trial court's suppression order.

BACKGROUND
At approximately 12:45 a.m. on April 13, 1993,
Fairfax City Police Officer Mraz observed Moyer drive
through a red light. When [*2] Officer Mraz pulled his
vehicle behind Mover's car and activated his emergency
equipment, he saw Moyer reach down and appear to place
something between the front seats. When Moyer stopped,

Officer Mraz shined his flashlight into the car in an attempt
to determine what Moyer had placed between the seats.
However, because of a lot of "stuff thrown about," he was
unable to see the item. When Officer Mraz approached
Moyer, he detected a strong odor of alcohol. As a result,
Officer Mraz requested Moyer to get out of his vehicle in
order to conduct a field sobriety test.
Moyer said that he would exit from the passenger side,
because the driver's door had been damaged. As Moyer
crawled head first across to the passenger's side of the car,
Officer Mraz saw Moyer reach down, pick something up,
and place it in the right front pocket of the jacket he was
wearing. Officer Mraz was unable to determine the nature
of the object.
After Moyer got out of the car, he stood along the
passenger side of the car with his hands in his jacket
pockets. Officer Mraz, concerned that the object Moyer
picked up could have been a weapon or drugs, asked
Moyer, at least twice, to take his hands out of his pocket
[*3] and place whatever he had in his pocket on top of the
vehicle. When Moyer did not comply, Officer Mraz drew
his service revolver and ordered him to place both his
hands on the vehicle. After Moyer did so, Officer Mraz
reached directly in Mover's right jacket pocket and
removed a baggie containing eleven individual packets of
cocaine. Officer Mraz handcuffed Moyer and placed him
in the back of his police cruiser. After searching Moyer's
vehicle, Officer Mraz got Moyer out of the police cruiser,
removed the handcuffs and had Moyer perform field
sobriety tests. At the completion of the tests, Officer Mraz
placed Moyer under arrest for driving while intoxicated.
In ruling on Moyer's motion to suppress, the trial judge
stated:
I'm going to grant the motion to suppress..
[A] pat down is required, under these circumstances.
And that the officer did not conduct that, in this case.
I know there was ~ I accept that there was a reasonable
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basis for the stop.
I will also accept that there was a
reasonable - and
I will so find - that there was a reasonable basis for the
officer to be concerned that the Defendant might have a
weapon in his clothing.
And [*4] I, certainly, accept that the
officer would be nervous. I would be,
believe me, a lot more nervous than the
officer would have been, if I were in these
circumstances.
However, I believe that the officer left out
the critical step of the pat down. I don't
think that
he can just immediately go in and start emptying pockets
or doing a search of somebody's clothing like that, without
having taken that extra step of a pat down, to see if there is
anything in his pocket that does feel like a weapon.
*******
The ironic part of this is the man was going
to be arrested for D. W.I., anyway. And the
car would have been searched or he would
have been searched at the Adult Detention
Center.
The Commonwealth's attorney responded: "Then the
argument is, Your Honor, at that point in time, then he's,
eventually, going to be searched anyway
That it would
have been found through a lawful search." In rejecting this
argument, the trial court stated:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule,
though, is
not to determine whether or not something would have
been, ultimately, allowable into evidence, if it had been
properly seized.
The purpose [*5] of the exclusionary rule
is to
discourage the police from conducting inappropriate
searches, to begin with.
That's the whole intention of it. And, while
the result in this particular case is that
something
that was, in fact, a crime is going to go unpunished, that's
the result that's going to obtain here.

The legality of the initial traffic stop was not challenged by
Moyer. The Commonwealth's evidence concerned only the
circumstances surrounding the seizure and search of
Moyer. The record fails to disclose any evidence regarding
standard arrest or search procedures employed by the
Fairfax City Police Department in drunk driving cases.
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
When reviewing the ruling on a suppression motion,
we consider the evidence most favorably to the prevailing
party below. "The judgment of a trial court sitting without
a j u r y . . . will not be set aside unless . . . plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it." Martin v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E2d 415, 418 (1987). The
burden to show reversible error rests upon the appellant,
the Commonwealth in this instance.
Reynolds v.
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 436, 388S.K2d659, 663
(1990). [*6]
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court clearly
erred when it refused to admit, under the "inevitable
discovery" doctrine, the cocaine seized from Moyer. We
disagree. In Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431, 81 L. Ed 2d
377, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), the United States Supreme
Court held that the fruits of an unconstitutional search
should be admitted under the following conditions:
If the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means
. . . then the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule]
has so little basis that the evidence should be received.
Id at 444.
In Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 347
S.E.2d 175 (1986), we approved the following three-part
test that the Commonwealth's evidence must satisfy for
application of the inevitable discovery exception:
"(1) a reasonable probability that the
evidence in question would have been
discovered by lawful means
but for the police misconduct, (2) that the leads making the
discovery inevitable were possessed by the police at the
time of [*7] the misconduct, and (3) that the police also
prior to the misconduct were actively pursuing the
alternative line of investigation."
Id at 656, 347 S.E.2d at
Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196,
citations omitted)). It
Commonwealth has the

185 (quoting United States v.
1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (other
is well settled that the
burden of establishing the
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applicability of the exception See, e g, Warhck v
Commonwealth 215 Va 263, 208 S E 2d 746 (1974),
Keeterv Commonwealth, 222 Va 134, 278 SE 2d 841,
cert denied, 454 US 1053, 70 L Ed 2d 589 102 S Ct
598 (1981) In the case at bar, the Commonwealth failed to
present any evidence to support a finding that there was "a
reasonable probability that the evidence in question would
have been discovered by lawful means but for the police
misconduct" Walls, 2 Va App at 656, 347 SE 2d at 185
The only evidence presented by the Commonwealth
relevant to the issue of inevitable discovery was that Moyer
was given a field sobriety test and was later arrested for

driving while intoxicated No evidence or argument was
presented regarding [*8] the normal course of police
investigation and procedures in cases of this nature
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that there
is insufficient evidence to satisfy the application of the
inevitable discovery exception Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court's suppression order
Affirmed
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